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FM THE SITUATION ROOM

TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

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TOHAK 310

MAY 24, 1974

TO: JERRY BREMER/PETER RODMAN
FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. FORTIFIED WITH YOUR VERY HELPFUL COMMENTS ABOUT A PRESIDENTIAL TRIP (HAKTO 140-142) I HAD A GOOD TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT AND I THINK LEFT HIM RELAXED ABOUT THE WHOLE THING. HE ACCEPTS THE 10TH AS THE EARLIEST FEASIBLE STARTING DATE, AND I OUTLINED FOR HIM, AS EXAMPLES, TWO ALTERNATIVE ITINERARIES. THE FIRST WOULD COVER JUST THE FIVE "MUST" COUNTRIES AND I TOLD HIM WE COULD DO THAT AND HAVE HIM HOME ON THE 17TH. ADDING THE NORTH AFRICAN STOPS, WE COULD STILL GET HIM HOME THE 19TH. I TOLD HIM THIS WAS JUST A FIRST, VERY ROUGH CUT BUT IT WOULD GIVE HIM AN IDEA THAT IT WAS MANAGEABLE. HE SAID THAT IN GENERAL HE WOULD PREFER ONLY ONE NIGHT PER STOP, TO AVOID ALL THE RECIPROCAL BANQUET FORMALITIES. I REPLIED THAT HE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER TWO NIGHTS IN CAIRO AND PERHAPS TWO IN ISRAEL, WHICH IS THE BASIS I HAD USED IN MY CALCULATIONS. I MENTIONED AGAIN SLIDING THE SOVIET TRIP THREE DAYS TO INCREASE THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE TWO TRIPS AND HE ASKED WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE UPSET AT OUR GOING TO THE MIDDLE EAST JUST BEFORE THE SUMMIT. I RESPONDED THAT I DID NOT BELIEVE SO BUT THAT WAS AN ISSUE THE TWO OF YOU SHOULD DISCUSS. HE SEEMED QUITE RELIEVED AT THIS CONVERSATION, AND EVEN HAD A MUCH MORE OBJECTIVE OUTLOOK ON MAKING THE TRIP AT ALL. I NOW THINK PART OF HIS PROBLEM MAY HAVE BEEN A FEELING OF UNCERTAINTY, WHICH WAS DISPELLED BY GIVING HIM A FEW DATES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIVE DETAILS. I HAVE NOT APPROACHED DOBRYNIN ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SLIPPING THE SOVIET TRIP UNTIL THE 27TH AND SEE NO REASON TO DO SO PRIOR TO YOUR RETURN.

2. THE PRESIDENT CALLED ME IN AGAIN LATER ON AND

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SECFILE

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RUMINATED AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT A NUMBER OF TOPICS. HE BEGAN BY SAYING HE WAS CONCERNED AT THE PICTURE THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD PRESENTED YESTERDAY. HE WONDERED IF THE SOVIETS AND/OR THE INDIANS MIGHT HAVE LONG TERM DESIGNS AND SAID HE THOUGHT WE OUGHT TO HAVE A STUDY TO EVALUATE THE POSSIBILITIES (I WILL HAVE A NSSM DRAWN UP FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION). HE THEN WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT ELECTIONS AND NEW GOVERNMENTS IN BRITAIN, GERMANY, FRANCE, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA. HE WONDERED HOW WILSON WOULD DO IN NEW ELECTIONS WITH HIS LABOR TROUBLES MOUNTING AND WE WENT ON TO DISCUSS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS IN GENERAL AND VARIATIONS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. HE THEN ASKED ABOUT THE PRC AND WHETHER THEY WERE TURNING ON US. I TOLD HIM THAT YOUR CONVERSATION WITH TENG HAD GIVEN NO INDICATION OF THAT. I NOTED THAT THEY ARE STILL UNDERGOING INTERNAL TURBULENCE BUT WE SAW NO CONCLUSIVE SIGNS THAT IT WAS HAVING ANY SUBSTANTIAL REFLECTION IN FOREIGN POLICY.

3. AN OP-ED ARTICLE BY GEORGE F. WILLS (SENT TO YOU SEPARATELY) ILLUSTRATES IN FULL THE PROBLEM WE WILL BE HAVING ON SALT. IN ESSENCE, HIS LINE IS THAT EVERYONE IN THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE NATIONAL INTEREST AT HEART ON SALT EXCEPT YOU AND THE PRESIDENT, WHO ARE LOOKING FOR A "QUICK-FIX" AT THE SUMMIT FOR PERSONAL REASONS. IT IS SICK.

4. THE PRESIDENT DEPARTED FOR KEY BISCAYNE AT 1300.
WARM REGARDS.

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